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 In modern societies, many of the decisions ordinary 
people are expected to make are based on numerical 
information. As a reflection of this fact, the contributions in 
this issue treat decisions and judgments based on numerical 
information in different formats and in different contexts. 
 Even though, we all want to use the information 
that is available to us in an optimal way when we make 
decisions, we are not always able to do so. This is particularly 
true for intuitive unaided decisions and therefore the set of 
six papers in this special issue section investigate some 
of these shortcomings and gives us some hints as how to 
overcome them.
 Decisions concern the future, and this means that 
outcomes and consequences of decisions will appear in 
the future. However, in most contexts what will happen 
in the future is not certain and different outcomes could 
follow a decision. Hence, many decisions have to be taken 
under risk and uncertainty, which is the main theme of the 
EGPROC1 papers of this issue. Because, the uncertainty of 
the future is often described by probabilities of different 
outcomes and consequences of a decision, much decision 
research including the papers in this issue have studied 
different aspects of probability. A methodological process 
perspective is another theme that also characterizes most of 
the contributions.
 Even though there is a common theme of risk and 
uncertainty, the papers are quite independent of each other 
and the interested reader may pick the ones she or he prefers 
to read without having read any of the other contributions.
 The first paper is by Ranyard, “A critical realist 
perspective on decisions involving risk and uncertainty” and 
investigates the theoretical foundations of decision making 
under risk with the aid of a philosophical critical realism 
perspective. The study proposes that this perspective has the 
potential to advance and unify disparate experimental and 
naturalistic lines of research and gives interesting examples 
of decision research using psychological process tracing 
techniques. 
 The second paper was written by Riege, Sulutvedt 
and Teigen “Format dependent probabilities: An eye-
tracking analysis of additivity neglect”. When we think 
about the future and try to estimate the probabilities of 
different individual events to happen, we sometimes forget 
that the probabilities of all possible events following, e.g., a 
decision should add to 1.0 (because at least one alternative 
event will occur with certainty). This bias depends on 
different factors and the authors study participants’  use of 
information processes and response times to shed light on 
the differences in the strength of the sub-additivity bias as 
a result of how the participants expressed their probability 
estimates.
 The third paper is by Schulte-Mecklenbeck 
and Küberger “Out of sight – out of mind? Information 
acquisition patterns in risky choice framing”. This paper 
concerns the so called framing effect, which is one of the 
phenomena studied most frequently in the area of risky 
decision making.  The effects of framing studied here are 
that when options are framed as if they were gains decision 
makers prefer a sure over a risky option and when the 
same problem is framed with the options as losses decision 
makers prefer a risky option over a sure option. The authors 
showed that the framing effect disappears when subjects 
are supplied with some redundant information.  Moreover, 
using the MouselabWeb technique, the authors found that 
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irrespective of redundancy, subjects tend to acquire more 
information about outcomes than about probabilities.
 The forth contribution is by Gonzalez and Svenson 
“Growth and decline of assets: Biased judgments of asset 
accumulation and investment decisions”. Interest rates 
increase capital and decline rates shrink money invested in 
funds or other assets. This paper studies decisions about 
how much money should be invested in a risky investment 
with a chance of both growth and loss of capital. The 
results showed, contrary to what one would believe, 
that the accumulation of capital prior to the investment 
decision played a greater role than the characteristics of the 
investment offers themselves. 
 The fifth paper was writen by Dida and Zakay 
“The confidence-frequency effect: A heuristic explanation”. 
Confidence in what we say and think varies. Sometimes 
we are absolutely certain that what we say is correct and 
sometimes we are less certain or we may even guess. 
Confidence can be expressed by, e.g., relative frequencies 
or probability of being correct related subjective measures. 
This paper compares two subjective measure of expressing 
confidence, who, unfortunately, give different results. 
With the aid of process measures, this study explains what 
participants do when they make their judgments  and why 
the measures differ.
 The sixth paper was written by Macko, Malawski 
and Tyszka “Belief in others’ trustworthiness and trusting 
behavior”. The research shows that one should distinguish 
between trust-as-belief (e.g. declared in surveys) and 
trusting behavior in economic interactions (e.g. in the trust 
game). In surveys people generally tend to declare that 
they do not trust others.  On the other hand, when people 
decide whether to send money to a partner in an economic 
interaction, their real rate of trust is relatively high. The 
authors showed that apart from the belief in trustworthiness 
of the partner, such factors as altruistic or “impurely 
altruistic” motives and a compromise effect  can influence 
decision about the amount of money they decided to transfer 
to a partner in an economic interaction.
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